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PERSUASIONt 
Joseph William Singer* 
[Horses] have always understood a great deal more than they let on. It is 
difficult to be sat on all day, every day, by some other creature, without 
forming an opinion about them. 
On the other hand, it is perfectly possible to sit all day, every day, on 
top of another creature and not have the slightest thought about them 
whatsoever. 
-Douglas Adams t 
[D]ialogue demands shared experience. 
-Drucilla Corne/12 
Lawyers spend a lot of time attempting to persuade other people. 3 
They persuade judges to promulgate rules of law that favor their cli-
ents. They persuade their law partners to adopt their interpretation of 
existing law or to adopt their strategy for litigation. They persuade 
clients to accept the dictates of the law. They persuade adversaries in 
settlement negotiations and their clients' business associates in con-
tract negotiations. They persuade legislatures to fund legal services 
for the poor, to adopt or to reject law reforms. 
Law professors spend most of their time teaching - or at least 
practicing - the art of persuasion. We do this by exposing students to 
a wide array of argumentative moves and countermoves in the context 
of real world disputes. Law students react to this training with deep 
ambivalence. On one hand, "thinking like a lawyer" has a broadening 
t © 1989 Joseph William Singer. 
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. B.A. 1976, Williams College; 
M.A. (Political Science) 1978, J.D. 1981, Harvard. - Ed. I presented this Article as a paper at 
the Faculty Workshop Series at Boston University School of Law in October 1988, and received 
a great many useful comments from my colleagues. As I have done in previous articles in the 
Boston University, California, and Stanford Law Reviews, and in keeping with this symposium's 
spirit of recognizing excluded voices, I have improved the standard citation form by including 
the full names of authors. I do so, first, to celebrate and give full credit to the creative individuals 
responsible for new ideas, and second, to make clear that these sources have a human origin -
people wrote and thought these things - and have only as much authority as we choose to give 
them. My goal is to humanize the sources, portraying scholarship as a continuing conversation, 
rather than as an elaboration of true principles based on a fixed and unchanging foundation. 
1. DOUGLAS ADAMS, DIRK GENTLY'S HOLISTIC DETECTIVE AGENCY 6 (1987). 
2. Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 291, 36,6 (1985). 
3. On law as the art of persuasion, see James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: 
The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 685 (1985) ("A modern law 
school is, among other things, a school in those arts of persuasion about justice that are peculiar 
to, and peculiarly effective in, our legal culture."). 
2442 
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effect: addressing real cases from the standpoint of both sides teaches 
students that questions they thought were easy are actually hard. No 
claim or interest or right appears to be absolute. Understanding the 
reasons why this is so, and why we might want to protect competing 
interests, helps students develop expertise in argumentative tactics. 
Moreover, by teaching students to recognize the complex and contra-
dictory nature of our values, legal education at its best clarifies the 
value choices we must make in governing social relations. This pro-
cess may be empowering. As one of my colleagues has said, it not only 
allows you to state a case for what you believe in, but it also allows 
you to become a terror at the dinner table. 
On the other hand, legal reasoning often appears narrow: the pro-
fessor may reject out of hand an argument that appears perfectly sensi-
ble, even compelling, to a layperson. Law professors have special 
professional knowledge of what kinds of arguments will have a chance 
of working in legal settings. At the same time, they may have serious 
disagreements about this, as well as about which arguments are worth 
attempting even if they are unlikely to succeed. This cultural knowl-
edge of the profession and the legal system cannot be reduced to a 
formula. Since everyone believes that some existing laws are wrong or 
unwise, everyone has the experience of wanting to argue for some re-
sult, but being told that the argument is out of bounds, or that it has 
no chance of success. Students are constantly surprised and frustrated 
by this process. They are also often confused about what it means to 
say that an argument will not work. Does it mean that their position 
is morally wrong or unjust, or does it simply mean that deci-
sionmakers - the people in power - have a professional or personal 
ideology that rejects the position, and that the argument is unlikely to 
persuade them to change their minds? 
Legal training creates a sense of conflict between the realization 
that one can argue for and against anything, and the realization that 
there are significant - even overwhelming - professional and social 
constraints on what counts as acceptable argument in particular con-
texts.4 Judges decide cases somehow, even though they know how to 
argue both for and against the results they reach - results which are 
often quite predictable. There may be a professional consensus that a 
particular law reform proposal is unlikely to persuade those who have 
the power to make the decision. But the fact that there is a consensus 
among a significant number of lawyers that an argument is out of 
bounds does not necessarily mean that it should be out of bounds. 
4. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenol-
ogy, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). 
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Lawyers may be experts in knowing which arguments are likely to 
work in particular contexts, but we are not necessarily experts in 
knowing which arguments ought to work. Yet many people confuse 
what works with what ought to work. Pangloss made this error, but 
we need not. 5 
It is the area of play between what can work and what ought to 
work that interests me. 6 Those who are happy with the status quo 
may see those categories as congruent; what ought to work has 
worked. These are the people who wax eloquent about the genius of 
the common law which somehow, despite itself, achieves results that 
promote efficiency or justice or common sense. Others may see terri-
ble injustice in the world, but feel that tragically little can be done to 
alleviate it; what ought to work may not be able to work. Others of us 
would like to believe that fundamental social and legal change is possi-
ble; what ought to work can work. Change is possible, 7 and those who 
have the power to implement significant changes in the law may some-
times be persuaded to do so. But how? Arguments and counterargu-
ments are nothing more than techniques. By themselves, they do not 
guarantee, or even promise, success. Persuasion is somewhat mysteri-
ous. It is especially puzzling when we attempt to persuade others 
about what values they should have. How is persuasion possible when 
one's fundamental values are at stake? Can we ever persuade each 
other about values? If we can, what moves us?8 
5. See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (John Butt trans. 1947). Dr. Pangloss' philosophy is summed 
up in the immortal phrase: "[l]n this best of all possible worlds, ... all is for the best." Id. at 20. 
6. James Boyd White argues that law is both a system of social constraint and a system of 
social change. When lawyers participate in the legal system, they speak in the existing legal 
rhetoric - so that they can be both understood and persuasive to those in power. But they also 
necessarily change that rhetoric by their very participation in the legal system. The law provides 
a social context, but that context is dynamic. Lawyers continually create and remake that con-
text by what they do within it. 
[Law] is always communal, both in the sense that it always takes place in a social context 
and in the sense that it is always constitutive of the community by which it works. Both the 
lawyer and the lawyer's audience live in a world in which their language and community are 
not fixed and certain but fluid, constantly remade, as their possibilities and limits are tested. 
The law is an art of persuasion that creates the objects of its persuasion, for it constitutes 
both the community and the culture it commends. 
White, supra note 3, at 691. 
7. At the same time, there appear to be significant limits on our ability to remake the world 
to eradicate injustice. Nor is there a consensus about what a just society would look like. 
8. There is a large literature about persuasion. It encompasses the fields of rhetoric, law 
(especially trial practice), psychology, sociology, and political science. See, e.g., HERBERT ABEL· 
SON & MARVIN KARLINS, PERSUASION: How OPINIONS AND ATIITUDES ARE CHANGED (2d 
ed. 1970) (psychology); ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE (Lane Cooper trans. 1932) 
(rhetoric); ROBERT BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER & 
STEVEN TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART (1985) (sociology of ideology); PAUL ERICKSON, REA-
GAN SPEAKS (1985) (political rhetoric); ROY GARN, THE MAGIC POWER OF EMOTIONAL AP-
PEAL (1960) (psychology); GARTH JowETI & VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND 
PERSUASION (1986) (social psychology); SONYA HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN (1985) 
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I faced this question in teaching my property students about plant 
closings. For the first two years that I taught the course, the discus-
sion revolved around what was to me a dismal story.9 A factory has 
operated in a city for more than fifty years. The city has grown up 
around the factory and has come to rely upon it, as have its employees. 
The company has benefited enormously from its long-term relation-
ship with the workers and the community. Yet the company appears 
unconcerned for their welfare. Instead, its officers focus on the bottom 
line; their only goal is to maximize profits and returns to shareholders. 
Ruled by a distant and seemingly unapproachable board of directors, 
the company closes the factory, putting thousands of people out of 
work, many of them permanently. The city faces a crisis. Many peo-
ple experience downward mobility. Even most of those who find work 
face reduced living standards. All of the workers face grave difficulties 
in putting their lives back together. 
It is a story of betrayal. The workers trusted the company and 
depended on it. The company lived off that trust, took advantage of it, 
and finally, abused it. 
Yet most of the students did not see it that way. On the contrary, 
although they believed that plant closings were regrettable, many of 
them understood the closings to represent a rather happy story - the 
efficient restructuring of production through the invisible hand of the 
free market. Io Everyone would be better off, most of them thought, if 
businesses could make economic decisions without regard to their so-
(trial practice); PROPAGANDA, PERSUASION AND POLEMIC (Jeremy Hawthorn ed. 1987) (polit-
ical psychology); DANIEL MCDONALD, THE LANGUAGE OF ARGUMENT (4th ed. 1983) (rheto-
ric); WAYNE MINNICK, THE ART OF PERSUASION (1957) (rhetoric); COERCION (Nomos XIV, J. 
Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds. 1972) (social psychology and law); CHAIM PERELMAN & 
LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans. 
1969) (rhetoric); RICHARD PETTY & JOHN CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION 
(1986) (social psychology); ROBERT REICH, TALES OF A NEW AMERICA (1987) (political rheto-
ric); PIERRE SCHLAG & DAVID SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING (1986) (legal argu-
ment); LAWRENCE SMITH & LORETTA MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION 
STRATEGIES (1985) (trial practice); K. PHILLIP TAYLOR, RAYMOND BUCHANAN & DAVID 
STRAWN, COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR TRIAL ATTORNEYS (1984) (trial practice); RICH-
ARD WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (1953) (rhetoric); SOCIAL INFLUENCE (Mark Zanna, 
James Olson & C. Peter Herman eds. 1987) (social psychology); Jerry Frug, Argument as Char-
acter, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988) (legal argument). 
9. The case is Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 
(6th Cir. 1980). On law as the creation of stories, see White, supra note 3, at 691-92 ("[Law] is a 
way of telling a story about what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by 
writing an ending to it."). 
10. See Gerald L6pez, A Declaration of War by Other Means (Book Review), 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1669-70 (1985) ("[O]ne must understand society as a network of competing power 
strategies. Individuals and groups exercise power through strategies that take the form of stories 
and arguments expressing their needs and aspirations. We are all caught up in the interaction of 
these competing power strategies.") (footnote omitted); see also Gerald L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984) (explaining the central role of stock stories in persuasion). 
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cial consequences. Those consequences matter, of course, but people 
adjust to change, as they always have. To the extent they find it diffi-
cult to adjust, the government provides an adequate safety net for 
those at the bottom of the economic ladder. Doesn't the government 
provide unemployment benefits (paid by the company) and food 
stamps and welfare for those who face desperate circumstances? How 
much more can the government do? 
When students explain why courts should not regulate plant clos-
ings, three arguments stand out. (1) The managerial prerogatives argu-
ment: Doesn't the company have the right to decide what to do with 
its property, to make basic investment decisions? (2) The freedom of 
contract argument: If the workers wanted higher severance payments 
or job training or a right of first refusal to purchase the factory, why 
didn't they bargain for these benefits? If we require a minimum level 
of entitlements, won't this interfere with the ability of the parties to 
bargain freely for arrangements that are mutually beneficial? (3) The 
deference to the legislature argument: Shouldn't the legislature, rather 
than the courts, be the body that creates new property rights? 11 
Conservative students are relatively confident and open about their 
beliefs in limited government and free enterprise. They firmly believe 
that government regulation - although intended to help dislocated 
workers - will actually make them worse off by hastening economic 
collapse of marginal companies and by stifling new investment. They 
confidently proclaim that government regulation of employment con-
tracts interferes with both the company's property rights to manage its 
business and the freedom of both the company and the workers to 
determine the terms of their association. Liberal students are much 
more tentative about their views. They worry about how we, as a soci-
ety, treat vulnerable people in times of crisis; yet they are embarrassed, 
almost apologetic, about their advocacy of government regulation. 
Doesn't that make them bleeding heart liberals? Just as liberalism 
came to be a dirty word in the last presidential election year, these 
students lost a language for talking about their values. They lack a 
way to tell a story of plant closings that presents, in a compelling and 
attractive way, the claims of displaced workers. They seem unable 
11. They also argue that government regulation of the free market is inefficient. It promotes 
waste by preventing the capital mobility needed to transfer resources to their most productive 
use. The fact that there are reasonable efficiency arguments both for and against regulating plant 
closings means that it is probably individual ideology that determines how people evaluate the 
available facts. See Jack Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Rea-
soning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1989). It is those value 
questions that concern me here. For an explanation of the "free market" efficiency argument, 
and what is wrong with it, see Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. 
L. REV. 611 (1988). 
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even to tell such a story to themselves, to justify their intuitions about 
the need for protection.12 
The readings and class discussions did little to clarify these mat-
ters. The judges who faced this case described in poignant rhetoric the 
painful dilemma the case presented. Some students felt that it was 
inappropriate to voice such sentiments in a court of law. Others felt 
that, even if it were appropriate to mention these concerns, it was 
wrong to give in to them. To rule on the basis of such concerns was 
what it meant to be a bleeding heart liberal - to give in to emotions at 
the expense of the facts. But maybe the case for plant-closing regula-
tion was not only an "emotional" one; perhaps there were good, hard-
nosed reasons to intervene, such as the need to remedy a market fail-
ure. To supplement the case, I gave the students an article I wrote, 
describing a complex of moral, doctrinal, and economic arguments for 
protecting the interests of the workers and the community in the con-
text of plant closings.13 Although the students could replicate these 
arguments, they appeared unmoved. Even the liberal students were 
uncomfortable. They felt the burden of proof was on their side, and 
they did not think, in the end, that they could overcome it. 
This situation worried me, but not because most of the students 
disagreed with my particular law reform proposal. It worried me as a 
teacher that my students failed to understand that many courts would 
understand plant closings as hard cases. Although they could easily 
recite doctrinal and policy arguments on behalf of the workers, they 
seemed unaware that some judges would react sympathetically to 
those claims. It was partly a matter of professional competence: they 
could not competently represent a company in a plant closing case if 
they could not see, and feel, the power of the arguments on the other 
side. To do a good job representing either side, they had to under-
12. On the ironic relationship between freedom of contract norms and oppression, see Avi 
Soifer's brilliant and eloquent article on the "free" choice of an emancipated slave to return to 
her home in the South - and face re-enslavement - to be with her family. Aviam Soifer, 
Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916 (1987). See also Aviam Soifer, Lib-
erty of Contrast: Notes Toward a Contrarian Approach to American Legal History (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author) (using a narrative approach to discuss several key cases 
that illustrate the complex tensions within American legal history). For a stunningly rich and 
insightful exploration of the social context in which contracts are made, see Jane Maslow Cohen, 
Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REV. 105 (1987). Three excellent discussions of the 
ways in which exploration of social context may influence our interpretation of contracts are 
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); 
Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1065 (1985) (describing how images of gender influence attitudes and interpretation of 
contractual relations); Robert Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987) (describing competing versions of the social context in which 
contracts are made). 
13. See Singer, supra note 11. 
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stand this to be (in Ronald Dworkin's phrase) a hard case. It was a 
matter of professional competence in a second way as well. By giving 
the students materials that elaborated both sides of the argument, I 
hoped that they would appreciate the difficult questions of property 
and contract law that these cases present. I hoped they would get 
some insight into why plant closings have been such a focus of recent 
political debate. I wanted the students to understand that a deci-
sionmaker might find the workers' arguments forceful because the 
marketplace works through a mixture of self-:reliance and trust. Al-
most no one takes the position that people have absolutely no rights 
other than those explicitly stated in their written agreements. All 
agreements take place in the context of legitimate social expectations 
about how the parties will deal with each other, which are not, and 
need not be, written down. 
But the difficulty of persuading the students that this was genu-
inely a hard case also led me to wonder: If it were possible at all to 
change someone else's mind, what would it take to persuade someone 
who had strong intuitions against "government regulation" that it was 
morally justified here? The detailed arguments I had constructed had 
created some amount of doubt about the fairness and wisdom of defer-
ring to the "free market" here, but they had done no more than that. 
By themselves, their persuasive force was limited. Something crucial 
was missing. 
The next couple of times I taught the course, I tried something 
different. I had much better success in getting across to students the 
competing norms at work here. I also got a clue as to what was miss-
ing in my attempt to persuade the students that they should see this as 
a hard case. It was, as Mari Matsuda has said, "[a] refusal to ac-
knowledge context - to acknowledge the actual lives of human beings 
affected by a particular abstract principle."14 The students understood 
intellectually that unregulated plant closings cause significant 
problems and create many victims. But they understood those victims 
through distanced analytic language; they were "externalities," rather 
than people with whom the students could empathize. 15 To remedy 
this problem, I gave the students the same set of readings - but when 
14. Mari Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Femi-
nist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613, 619 (1986). On the relation 
between format conceptions of race and actual experience of it, see Neil Gotanda, Towards a 
Critique of Colorblind: Abstract and Concrete Race in American Law (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author); see also Julius Getman, Voices, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 577 (1988) (describing the 
role of the human voice in persuasion). 
15. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 
(1988) (explaining the interconnection between reason and passion). 
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I came into the classroom, I did not mention the problem of plant 
closings. Instead, I told the following story: 
* * * 
This did not happen, but suppose it did happen. For some time now, 
the faculty of the law school has been worried about the declining com-
petence of attorneys. Chief Justice Warren Burger has voiced concerns 
about the preparation and competence of the Supreme Court bar. Re-
cent scandals have arisen involving lawyer neglect of client matters, vio-
lation of ethical norms, and even violations of law. We have therefore 
commissioned a study to investigate how legal education can contribute 
to protecting the public from unprepared or unethical lawyers. Our 
study indicates that the bottom third of our graduating class will never 
be truly competent at the complexities of the practice of law. This situa-
tion demands a remedy. Your examinations for the first year of law 
school are next week As a consumer protection measure, we intend to 
give failing grades to the bottom thirty-three percent of the class. The 
bottom third will flunk out of school The old way of doing things was 
right. Look to the left of you; look to the right of you. One of you will 
not be here in the fall You are free to apply to transfer to other law 
schools, but we will not recommend you to them. In fact, if they ask us, 
we will candidly inform them that we are pessimistic about your ability 
to make it in the profession. We recognize that this new policy is a 
substantial change from our previous grading curve, under which only 
two to three percent of each class would be asked not to return. We 
know that many of you will be surprised and disappointed at our change 
in policy. Nonetheless, it is a necessary measure to promote the efficient 
delivery of legal services. 
You bring a lawsuit, asking the court to order the law school to allow 
you to graduate on the basis of the rules that were in effect at the time 
you accepted our offer to come here. Do you have any rights? 
* * * 
Students react to this story with alarm. There is some nervous 
laughter. They overwhelmingly feel that a sudden change of policy 
like this is fundamentally unfair, and that they should be entitled to 
relief. The feeling is not always unanimous, although sometimes it is. 
Even when it is not unanimous, it is clear that those who take a hard-
line, antiregulatory approach here understand that the burden of proof 
is on them. 
I take the position that the school is perfectly entitled to determine 
how to run its program. I give a series of arguments justifying auton-
omy for the school administration. These arguments track the three 
most common arguments against regulating plant closings. The stu-
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dents understand the role I am playing, and argue that such a policy 
would violate their rights. But they are not playing a role. They want 
to win the argument. The discussion goes something like this: 
I. THE MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVES ARGUMENT 
Do you have any rights? 
Of course we do. You can't change the rules midstream like that. 
Why not? We run the school,· we're in charge here. We can do what 
we think is required to produce top-quality lawyers,' that is our job. 
That's true, but you can't act as if we weren't here. You can't just 
ignore our needs or the fact that you misled us by telling us that one 
system was in effect and then changing in the middle. If we had 
known you were going to do this, we would have gone somewhere else. 
That may be true, but it is not to the point. We have made an expert 
judgment about the needs of the profession. It is always disappointing to 
be told you are not up to snuff. But we have to think about the larger 
picture. We are making sure that the market for legal services works 
well 
Maybe you're wrong about that. You should at least listen to our 
side. When what you do affects us so powerfully, we should have 
something to say about it. You have no right to change school policy 
in a way that affects us so deeply without consulting us. 
What good would it do to discuss it with you? We are the experts. 
We make policy here, and we know what we're doing. What could you 
possibly say that would change our minds? Facts are facts. Someone 
once said that the truth may make us free, but first it will make us 
miserable. 
Even if you are right, you don't make policy in a vacuum. It is 
unfair for you to destroy our careers when we could not have known 
that you were going to apply these new rules to us. What you are 
doing is the equivalent of an ex post facto law. 
Whether or not it is unfair to you, we have an obligation to do our 
jobs to produce good lawyers. We have an obligation not to grant law 
degrees to people who are not competent to practice law. We have an 
obligation to be fair to the people our graduates will be serving. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ARGUMENT 
Of course you must exercise your judgment about how to run the 
law school. But even if you are right that you need to be more selec-
tive about whom you graduate, you cannot change policy retroac-
tively. We had an agreement. You can't back out now. 
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What agreement? 
Your literature explains school policies, including the grading 
curve. It explains that ninety-eight percent of your graduates get jobs 
in law-related fields after graduation. This unmistakably suggests that 
if we attend this law school, we will do well in the legal profession. It 
would be fraudulent for you to renege on those promises. You are 
estopped from denying those claims. 
Who made those claims? 
It is all in the catalogue. 
Oh, the catalogue. The catalogue is very carefully written. It was 
drafted by lawyers. It contains no promises of any kind. In fact, it says 
in big, bold letters: Subject to change at any time without notice. 
Didn't you read that part? 
What are you talking about? You send out the catalogue, obvi-
ously intending to induce us to attend your school by your claims 
about your ability to produce and place your graduates. We relied on 
those claims; we trusted your good faith. You have no right to say 
now that those claims are meaningless. 
They were not meaningless. They just were not legally enforceable 
promises. 
But you led us to think they were promises. You knew we would 
rely on them. 
If you wanted the security of knowing that you would be able to 
graduate on the basis of the rules in effect at the time you came here, 
why didn't you bargain for it? 
What? Who would we have talked to? 
The Dean, of course. 
It would never have occurred to us that you would renege on those 
commitments. 
You made a mistake. You should have been more careful. The law 
rewards people who are self-reliant. The courts cannot remake your 
contracts for you, giving you the benefit of entitlements that were not 
part of the bargain. It would be paternalistic for the courts to interfere 
in freely negotiated contracts in that way. It is better to leave the terms 
of contracts to the free market, rather than government fiat. 
Freely negotiated? It was a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We did not 
negotiate about anything. 
It does not matter. There are lots of law schools, lots of law stu-
dents. Lots of buyers and sellers means a competitive market. Supply 
and demand determine the terms of arrangements in the market for 
, legal education. If our policy change decreases the number of students 
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who apply here, that is our business. We bet that other law schools will 
follow our lead. The American Bar Association may even commend us 
for our service to the profession. 
That does not mean that we understood that you would treat us so 
shabbily. Why couldn't you at least make the change prospective? If 
the bottom third of this year's class needs extra help, why not give 
them a longer time to learn the subject matter? Why not let them 
repeat a year? 
The cost is just too high. This would require us to accept fewer stu-
dents next year, and to spend much of our time attempting to retrain 
people who need special attention. It is just not worth it. Besides, law is 
not the only thing you can do. There are lots of jobs out there. You all 
have college degrees. Go do something else. 
You are being unbelievably callous. Of course we can do some-
thing else. But it means we may have to move; we may have to change 
our life plans entirely. This is bitterly disappointing. We trusted you, 
and you have no right to abuse that trust. 
III. THE DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE ARGUMENT 
Suppose you are right that it is effectively fraudulent for us to 
change the rules in the middle of the game. Suppose you have a right to 
rely on the representations made in the catalogue and on our good faith. 
Suppose you have a right to assume that the program you enter will not 
change dramatically while you are here. This still does not explain why 
a court of law should grant you injunctive or even monetary relief. You 
are asking for something extraordinary. You are asking for the right to 
attend our law school, to participate in our program, and to be granted 
a law degree that will enable you to enter the legal profession - and all 
this against the better judgment of the professors who run the school 
Moreover, it is not something we promised you; you did not bargain for 
it. In the absence of a contract giving you this right, your claim is effec-
tively an argument to create a new property right - an entitlement to 
receive a law degree. That would be a momentous change in the law. 
Isn't the democratically elected legislature the appropriate body to cre-
ate new property rights, rather than the courts? 
The legislature is not going to address this problem. And even if 
they do, any regulation is unlikely to help us. Moreover, courts have 
the obligation to enforce the rights of the parties, and to protect rea-
sonable reliance. The law is not static, but changes over time, and the 
courts have the duty to change the law to fit new social conditions and 
values. 
But the consequences of creating a new property right are momen-
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tous. The courts are not experts in determining the consequences of 
interfering in the free market in this way. On the contrary, the law 
faculty are the experts on legal education and the needs of the legal 
system. We know what policies will work and which ones won't. Why 
shouldn't the court defer to our judgment? If we are wrong, the legisla-
ture can hold hearings, get evidence, and determine whether there is 
political support for redistributing property rights. 
The courts have the obligation to promote justice. If the legisla-
ture determines that law faculties should have carte blanche to run 
roughshod over the rights of law students, it can promulgate a law 
saying so. In the absence of such an appalling statute, the courts 
should prevent the law school from defrauding its students by tram-
pling on our reasonable expectations. I will say it again: We trusted 
you, and you have no right to abuse that trust. 
* * * 
I had hoped to persuade the students that their initial intuitions 
about the norms governing the marketplace were oversimplified. This 
exercise did seem to enable the students to see that there was some-
thing to the arguments they had at first rejected out of hand. Why did 
the exercise work in this way? I do not think that what made the 
difference was simply a crass appeal to the students' self-interest, 
although I certainly did appeal to their self-interest. I think the exer-
cise worked for two, somewhat paradoxical, reasons. On one hand, it 
encouraged the students to try to empathize with the victimized work-
ers. On the other hand, it taught the students something about them-
selves and their own beliefs of which they had been unaware. 
Together, these two moments created a sense of connection between 
the students and the workers. This sense of connection created a felt 
relationship between them where before they had felt no connection. 16 
16. A felt relationship may be created in a variety of ways. One way is to adopt a dialogue 
form. This form is often adopted as a persuasive device to highlight both arguments and 
counterarguments and competing perspectives. The dialogue form itself enacts the relationship it 
seeks to create. It poses two persons in a dialogic relationship with each other. For this form of 
presentation to be effective, both parties must be committed to the dialogue as a joint project, and 
both must make the effort to understand the perspective of the other. On dialogic relations as a 
form of normative argument, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 
(1980); Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and Complacency, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 693 (1987); 
Cornell, supra note 2; Drucilla Cornell, Two Lectures on the Normative Dimensions of Commu-
nity in the Law: In Defense of Dialogic Reciprocity, 54 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1987). A second way 
to create a felt relationship is by use of parables. See, e.g., Allan Hutchinson, And Law (or 
Further Adventures of the Jondo), 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 285 (1987); Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 
87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978); Martha Minow, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: A Parable, 138 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1989); Robert Williams, Jr., Tak-
ing Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for People of Color, 5 
LAW & INEQUALITY 103 (1987). For examples of persuasive parables which also use dialogue, 
see Kathryn Abrams, The Deluge: A Trial and Judgment in One Act (Book Review), 65 TEXAS 
L. REV. 661 (1987); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term - Foreword: The Civil Rights 
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Creating the relationship enabled persuasion to occur. 17 
The story encouraged students to see the world from someone 
else's perspective. 18 Understanding plant closings as the efficient re-
structuring of the economy takes the perspective either of an outsider 
viewing the system as a whole or of the corporate managers who make 
investment decisions on behalf of shareholders. An outsider to the 
drama can easily choose to focus on the performance of the economic 
system in the aggregate, rather than the impact of investment policy 
on particular victims of economic change. Managers may take the 
view that the goal of maximizing returns to shareholders requires un-
hindered discretion to transfer investments freely from one economic 
activity or region to another. Either of these perspectives may rest on 
the assumption that people get what they bargain for, and that eco-
nomic actors have no duty to act to help others absent an explicit 
promise to do so. By asking for regulation of the employment con-
tract to protect their interests in the event of a plant closing, workers 
are asking for special privileges to which they are not entitled. These 
perspectives also assume that both the bargains that take place in the 
marketplace and the distribution of property and skills that are ex-
changed in those bargains are generally fair and legitimate. 
What is missing in the free market story is the fact that the relative 
bargaining power of the parties to consensual transactions is often 
woefully unequal, and that economic actors - both weak and power-
ful - often legitimately rely on the good faith of others. However, 
merely explaining this to be the case is not sufficient to persuade a 
person who takes the perspective of the social engineer or the corpo-
rate manager. Such a person may start from an assumption that, in 
the case of unionized industries, workers are sufficiently powerful to 
get the contract terms that they have a right to expect. Because this is 
so, the workers have no right to complain when they did not bargain 
for special protections. Believing this story allows the decisionmaker 
to distance herself from the workers' situation. 
Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915 
(1988). 
17. A somewhat different, but related, process is described in Jerry Frug's article on argu· 
ment as an appeal to a particular character. Frug, supra note 8. Professor Frug explains that 
persuasive arguments "appeal simultaneously to a notion of the self and a notion of society." Id. 
at 875. This aspect of argument works by asking the listener to imagine herself as the sort of 
person who would identify with persons of a certain character. To the extent this appeal is 
successful, the listener is persuaded by a deeply felt sense of commitment to an imagined commu· 
nity of persons. 
18. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987). 
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This is why an empathic narrative19 describing the effects of a 
plant closing on workers is not necessarily adequate to convey the re-
ality of that situation. My initial inclination had been to tell a story 
that would enable the students to empathize with the workers in the 
case by giving a "thick description"20 of their situation. But this strat-
egy could not work if the students simply did not believe that the 
workers were in fact vulnerable or that the company's action was an 
illegitimate breach of trust. The only way to break through this bar-
rier was for me to imagine a situation in which my audience would 
themselves feel both vulnerable and betrayed. This situation would 
convey the message that ordinary people, like themselves, sometimes 
feel powerless in the face of large institutions on which they are heav-
ily dependent - that ordinary people, like themselves, rely on the 
good faith of others in the marketplace. 
The law school example was a good one because it described a 
situation that the students could understand and which enabled them 
to experience both vulnerability and broken trust. The story forced 
the students to imagine what it would be like to be vulnerable to the 
whims of an institution which had a significant power to determine the 
shapes of their lives. Perhaps more important, law schools are institu-
tions that many students would imagine to be outside the rough and 
tumble of the marketplace. I do not mean that they would not under-
stand that there is fierce competition to get into the better law schools 
or that law schools compete to place their graduates in legal jobs. I 
mean that both the professional and educational nature of the institu-
tion would conjure up images of dependability and high moral stan-
dards. The professions, after all, ostensibly require high standards of 
ethics from their members, and schools are in the business of promot-
ing knowledge. Neither one focuses entirely on profit maximization or 
self-interest. This may be why students say that when they graduate 
they go out into the "real world." 
By telling the story, I conveyed the message to the students that 
the law school was not in fact out of the market, but was an economic 
actor just like a steel company. Law students do not spend their years 
in school in a fairy tale; the world they are in is very real. In this way, 
19. See Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987). Hender-
son writes: 
The argumentative steps taken to convey human situations to a judge might be described 
as creating affective understanding by use of a narrative that includes emotion and descrip-
tion ("thick" description, if you will) of a human situation created by, resulting from, or 
ignored by legal structures . . . . I shall refer to such arguments as "empathic narratives" 
Id. at 1592 (footnote omitted). 
20. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-30 (1973). 
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I hoped to get the students to ponder the connection between their 
dependence on the law school and the steelworkers' dependence on the 
employer. "Oh," they could say, "that is what it might feel like to lose 
your job after twenty-five years, with an inadequate pension, two kids 
in college, and an elderly father in a nursing home. That is what it 
feels like to have your life disrupted, your hopes dashed, your plans 
shattered. That is what it feels like to have nowhere to go." 
Getting students to imagine themselves in a vulnerable and depen-
dent position would not carry a moral message unless they believed 
that they would have a right to fair treatment in that situation. Per-
suasion ordinarily works, not by convincing others to change their val-
ues, but by making them aware of values they already have which they 
simply had not initially thought were relevant in this situation.21 As 
Martha Nussbaum argues: "[M]ost people, when asked to generalize, 
make claims that are false to the complexity and the content of their 
actual beliefs. They need to learn what they really think."22 The stu-
dents' feeling that it would be outrageously unfair for the law school to 
surprise them by changing the rules in the middle of their education 
enabled them to become conscious of values they already held, but 
which they had assumed were not relevant in the plant closing situa-
tion. The story forced them to confront the question: If it is all right 
for the steel company to close the factory in furtherance of its property 
interests, why isn't it legitimate for the law school to change its educa-
tional policy as it sees fit? If you feel, on the contrary, that it would be 
unfair for the law school to act in bad faith, why is it fair for the steel 
company to do so? 
This means that Oliver Wendell Holmes' appeal to the 
felt needs of society23 or Karl Llewellyn's appeal to "situation-
21. Professor Crenshaw makes a parallel argument: 
People can only demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are 
challenging. Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic - that is, de-
mands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology - will proba-
bly be ineffective. 
The possibility for ideological change is created through the very process of legitimation, 
which is triggered by crisis. Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by chal-
lenging an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. Such crisis occurs 
when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction between the dominant ide-
ology and their reality. 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in An-
tidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (1988) (footnotes omitted). 
22. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 10 (1986). 
23. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the 
time, 'the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good 
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963). 
August 1989] Persuasion 2457 
sense"24 are not necessarily enough to persuade someone about a par-
ticular dispute. The situation sense of most of my students in re-
sponse to plant closings was that this was an area of life appropriately 
left to the "free market," meaning the relative bargaining power of the 
parties. It took the closer-to-home example of the law school to enable 
them to realize that they often expect economic actors to comply with 
general norms of trust. The example forced them to realize that self-
reliance is not the only norm that drives the market; nor do they think 
it should be. The market operates on a combination of self-reliance 
and reliance on relationships with others. Without a great deal of 
trust among market participants, the market could not operate. It is, 
after all, a market, and not a state of war. We value self-reliance, but 
self-reliance is not all that we value. The story brought the students in 
touch with the complexity of their moral intuitions. It enabled them 
to understand the case as one of moral conflict, rather than one that 
could be easily solved. 
This realization changed them. It did this partly by bringing them 
in touch with their own values. But, perhaps more important, it 
changed them by bringing them in touch with others. It remade their 
relationship with those others. 25 The students had identified, con-
sciously or unconsciously, with the corporate managers who desired 
the freedom to manage what they saw as their business. These manag-
ers occupy a hierarchal relation to the workers they employ; they exer-
cise significant power over the workers' lives. In effect, by viewing the 
world from the perspective of the managers, the students placed them-
selves in an imagined hierarchial relationship with the workers. It is 
as if the students had adopted the position of the rider on the horse, 
unaware of their own power relationship with the horse. Persuasion 
could not possibly occur unless the students got down off the horse so 
that they could see the world from the perspective of the workers.26 
Seeking to understand the perspective of the other is a precondition to 
persuasion. Without such an effort, we commit what Patricia Wil-
liams has called "spirit-murder, or disregard for others whose lives 
24. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 121-57 (1960). 
25. See Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Re-
tarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 
179 (1987) ("Knowledge and identity are forged in social relationships."); White, supra note 3, at 
696 (Law is a "radically ethical [enterprise], by which self and community are perpetually 
reconstituted."). 
26. See Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race - Does the Funda-
mental Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988) (Because white 
persons do not share the recurring experience of racial treatment faced by minorities, they must 
constantly relearn what racism is.). 
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qualitatively depend on our regard."27 
Perhaps, then, persuasion starts by creating a relationship between 
oneself and others. Such a relationship does not connect people who 
were unconnected; it makes them aware of the connections they al-
ready have. The relationship changes who one is. In so doing, it clari-
fies what one really thinks. In this way, we may redefine our values. 
Persuasion begins when the rider notices the horse, and the fact that 
the horse cannot speak. The rider can never know what the horse 
knows. To get even a glimpse of what the horse is thinking, the rider 
must look the horse in the eye. But to do that, the rider must get 
down off the horse and walk a little way. Persuasion is what happens 
when the rider turns around. 
27. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as 
the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 151 (1987). 
